

## Memo on: *Critical Perspectives on Global Governance:*

### Panel V. *Securitizing Global Governance*

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#### **Panel Overview:**

This panel deals with the essential question of how and to what extent security is also a matter of global governance and what the implications of this are. The handling and definition of security, the and the control over the use of legitimate use of organised force is one of the basic prerogatives attached to statehood. It might be recalled that one of the most widely cited and used understandings of what a state *is*, is the Weberian one: a state is defined as an authority which successfully claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of organised force in a given territory. One issue which is raised by the global governance of security is hence what the implications of moving governance "upward" to international institutions for conventional understandings of security. A second fundamental issue is the challenge posed by the emergence and new roles taken on by non-state actors in the global governance. The contributions to this panel tackle both of these fundamental issues in critical ways.

#### **Summary of the Contributions:**

The papers on this panel complement and speak to each other in interesting ways. One of the papers (Anna Leander's) probes the question of the extent to which including security concerns in global governance requires and rests on a revision of statist notions of which uses of force are legitimate and which are not. A second paper (Elke Krahnemann's) is concerned with the extent to which the increased inclusion of private actors in the governance of security is creating problems for handling (and managing) security questions as well as with what possible options there might be for reducing these problems. And a last paper (Jason Forrester and Brian Finlay's) is written from an activist perspective and it nicely illustrates the role that private actors carve out for themselves in the global

governance of security by looking at the strategy of one specific private actor (the Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign) which is trying to influence and promote global governance of one specific issue: namely the control of nuclear weapons.

**Anna Leander's** contribution focuses on the extent to which global governance of security is driven by and necessitates a revision of the understanding of which uses of force are legitimate and which are not. She starts by arguing that in modern political thought, states have been seen as defining the nature of legitimate use of force within their own territory and that the international discussion of legitimate use of force has therefore (in principle) been reduced to the discussion of just and unjust wars. Even if the relativism about the legitimate use of force inside states which is hence implied has never been absolute, it none the less makes it difficult to imagine how it could be compatible with a "global governance" of security. And indeed, as the rest of the paper argues the emergence of a sort of global governance of security has been prompted by (and only possible through) important changes in the understanding of what is meant by legitimate use of force and who can define it.

Anna then proceeds to argue that although the "bias in favour of states" enshrined in modern political thinking has by no means evaporated, it been drastically reduced. There are two key reasons for this reduction: the first is that the increasing discrepancy between the boundaries of polities and the boundaries of states. And that discrepancy makes the idea that states are legitimate in their use of force increasingly strenuous and contested. The second is that non-state actors have managed to make credible claims both about the legitimacy of their own use of violence and the non-legitimate uses of state violence. The two central sections of the paper focus on developing this argument and showing the reason for these trends. A forth section of the paper draws the link between the diminished bias in favour of states and the development of "global governance" in security arguing in particular that the combination of the two trends result in a very partial form of universalism (cosmopolitanism) combined with a great deal privatisation of the authority to decide on the use of force, both of which are deeply problematic from a political and ethical point of view and make it imperative to think about the development of political institutions and

procedures which would make it possible to ground the global governance of security in more equitable and adequate political processes. The conclusion of the paper draws attention to some directions emerging thinking on this question is taking.

**Elke Krahmman's** contribution focuses on the role of private actors in security governance. Her paper starts by identifying governance as something opposed to government (by the state and state institutions) and hence by something which grants non-state actors an increased role. From this perspective, the development of global governance of security is by definition a matter of private actors taking on an increased role. And in the second section of her paper, Elke goes on to delineate the increased role of some key non-state actors in the governance of international security. She discusses in particular the role of NGOs, of armament corporations, and of transnational private security companies.

She then proceeds to discuss key governance failures this privatisation of governance leads to. And here she identifies problems of transparency and accountability, of control, of coordination, and of efficiency. She points out that these failures are both normative in the sense that they stem from a clash between prevailing interests and understandings of what governance should be and practical in that it turns out to be difficult to implement or carry out governance. In her last section she then draws on the experience in policing where privatisation has longer roots and has gone further, to look at what kinds of options and solutions one might find to these governance failures. And she argues that regulation, enforcement of contractual obligations, efforts to institutionalise collaboration and liason, reliance on self regulation, and the reliance on market mechanisms and increased professionalisation. In the course of the discussion she is careful to point out that these measures are no panacea. They are of varying importance and efficiency and in particular cannot be expected to resolve the "normative" governance failures which stem from persistent beliefs in the superiority of government as opposed to governance.

**Jason Forrester and Brian Finaly's** paper nicely illustrate Krahmman's point that private actors play an important role in the global governance of security. Their paper is about one specific private actor: the nuclear threat reduction campaign (NTRC) for which they are both working. The campaign is focussed on preventing the proliferation and use of

Russian nuclear weapons and materials and on the conversion of Russian nuclear scientists. The paper outlines first why and how the NTCR see this as a central problem, linking it both to concerns with nuclear warfare in general and to more specific concern with the risk that nuclear weapons might be used by private actors (and al-Qaeda in particular). It then proceeds to a an overview of the state of affairs (as indicated by the may 2002 treaty between Russia and the US) and then points out that though this might be a step on the road, much remains to be done. And urgently so since "the ironic fact is" that the treaty could make it more difficult to prevent nuclear proliferation in particular to terrorists.

From here they state their own approach. Departing from the 1995 final report of the commission on global governance and their adherence to the strategy for nuclear disarmament suggested in that report, the authors proceed to present their own approach which consists of increasing awareness in the US. They stress the importance of influencing the attitudes of US policy-makers, of increasing the transparency and debate surrounding the issue of nuclear strategy in the US (in particular by making the single integrated operation plan public) and the importance of creating "new stakeholders" in the form of a wider constituency. The paper makes a point out of the fact that in doing this the NTRC is using strategies conventionally used by interest group politics. In the last sections of the paper the authors outline their overall goals and objectives for 2002-3, their overall policy agenda and their "benchmarks of success".

### **The Contribution of the Panel to a Critical Discussion of Global Governance:**

The papers on this panel make an interesting lot both because they complement each other well, but also because they have a variety of often contradictory reflections and critical things to say about global governance of security. And in this brief overview I am organising those reflections and critical aspects of the thinking as reflected in the papers by theme and will try to stress disagreements rather than commonalities in the positions taken by the authors.

#### On the understanding of global governance:

The papers on this panel have greatly diverging basic understandings of what is

entailed by global governance. Elke's paper is the one which takes the by far most explicit stance on what is to be understood by this term. And it is very clear from her first section that she sees global governance as something opposed to (state) government. It marks a shift of authority from states to non-state actors and/or to (public or private) international institutions. The other two papers are more implicit but by the way they use the term, it seems possible to deduce that their understanding is quite different. At the opposite end of the spectrum is the NTRC paper which clearly sees global governance as being essentially a matter of states governing (in this case nuclear threats) through negotiations, treaties or (state based) international institutions. The whole strategy for global governance is based on trying to influence governments (and in particular the US government). And finally implicit in Anna's paper is a view on global governance which links it to the location of authority at the international level, whether the actors involved are primarily state based or not.

A first critical and contentious issue hence revolves around the question of what global governance is and how it relates to international institutions and the international system and hence to what extent "global governance" is in any way distinguishable from what has prevailed since the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 or not. And these questions are of course important not least because the answer we give will say much about the extent we need to rethink the way we conceive of international relations and international security.

On the role of non-state actors in global governance:

A second issue on which the paper givers on this panel take widely diverging positions is on the nature of the import and the role played by non-state actors. There seems to be a common position from which all the paper givers depart: private actors are very important. The NTRC paper is largely about underlining the importance of the own campaign and hence of the actions carried out by non-state actors. And for Anna and Elke it is a central part of the argument that private actors have become more important. An important part of Elke's paper is about describing the increased role of various non state actors and for Anna the increased capacity of non-state actors in defining legitimacy occupies one of the two main sections. But here agreement stops. When it comes to evaluating the role of private actors

positions diverge widely. The NTRC paper clearly takes the view that non-state actors (at least the NTRC) have a potentially very positive role to play in global governance at least when it comes to shaping public policy. Inversely, Elke is chiefly concerned with "governance failures" which arise from the increased role of private actors in privatisation. And, finally, Anna seems rather undecided about whether the increased role of private actors in defining (and employing sic) legitimate force is positive or negative.

This question of how to judge and what to think about the (I think) agreed upon central role of non-state actors in global governance seems very central to this panel and to the debate about global governance more broadly. Indeed, it raises a host of questions about the relative virtues of private and public authority (for different people, groups, countries and political aims) as well as the more practical question of how to create political processes which can integrate private and public authorities and provide more just forms of global governance.