

**Philipp S. Mueller**

### **Politicizing Global Governance**

1. Ulrich Brand: *Order and Formation: Global Governance as a possible hegemonial discourse of the internationally political*
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All papers in the Politicizing Global Governance Panel deal with how do we use the concept of global governance and how this usage prestructures world politics. In the following, I ask why this type of inquiry is interesting and then focus on the main arguments of the individual panelists.

During times of transformative change, important aspects of politics take place on the level at which we imagine the world. This level is not normally the focus of the logos of politics conceptualized as science. In our normal science practice we outsource this task to the jester at court, i.e. approaches that we refer to as critical.

However, during times of transformation, when the world changes in a way that the concepts we have to describe it lose their descriptive power as the world

morphs before our eyes, and even policy makers start asking philosophical questions, these critical approaches allow us to describe this process of change.

However, a critical perspective alone is not enough to actually access the politics that take place on this level, and this has been realized by the authors. Only (a) the inclusion into the discourse of policy makers, who actually shape the world by imagining it and acting in it, and (b) the acceptance that theory influences practices allow us meaningfully access the politics of global governance. Therefore, during such times, it becomes necessary to unearth the politics in seemingly neutral vocabulary and practice of political science.

This is especially important because international relations, in its interdisciplinary manifestation comprising scholars from international law, sociology, political science, focusing on the contested international and/or global realm, is a unique field. Firstly, as in all social realms, truth is dependent on its objects of analysis: what policy makers think is true becomes the truth-- if they act upon it. Secondly, international relations is a very small discipline both on the policy and theory levels, allowing individuals to play a large role in imagining the world we think about and act within. And thirdly, international policy making is an abstract practice, a very theoretical enterprise, especially in contrast to local politics. We reify and anthropomorphize corporate actors, such as states and supranational organizations, and consequently our expectations about appropriate behavior are very much dependent on what characteristics we ascribe to these 'non-natural' persons.

So counter-intuitively, for this very specific type of problem, real-world relevance is not acquired by an empiricist research design, but by a critical reflection of the vocabulary we use to describe and explain in order to achieve a better understanding of what we are actually saying and doing when we are talking and practicing global governance. This is precisely what the authors have done, focusing on global governance as a heuristic tool and a political project. This is a moment where high theory has great real-world relevance, because it takes its role in constructing the world.

### **1. Ulrich Brand: Order and Formation. Global Governance as a possible hegemonial discourse of the internationally political**

Ulrich argues that global governance is a “search process” for a “post-Fordist compromise” in the international realm. He distinguishes between two types of global governance discourses, a “red-green” (referring to the coalition government between the SPD and the Green Party in Germany and the cultural revolution this has entailed) and a “neoliberal” (American) version. The neoliberal version entails the international securing of private property rights against states and international organizations, while the “red-green” version focuses on alleviating the negative consequences of globalization and wants to be perceived as an alternative to the “US-sponsored” neoliberal project. He expects the Global Governance discourse to play an important role in the politics of globalization. The discourse and especially its “red-green” version are a reaction to the “structural changes” the world is undergoing. He argues that the Fordist compromise (the “embedded liberalism” of the Cold War years) has been revoked and the global governance discourse has the chance to become the new hegemonic compromise. This compromise, however, will

entail the legitimacy of some concepts such as efficiency, functionalist understanding of politics, and the reliance on techniques such as best practice, while devaluing other types of knowledge. In his own words:

... This contribution is concerned with the importance of global governance as a discourse in the context of the globalization-based restructuring of the political, particularly at the international level. It is intended in this way to contribute to the analysis of current formation of hegemony. Following the dissolution of the Fordist compromises since the 1980s the issue at stake is now the construction of post-Fordist compromises, particularly in the sphere of the political. Global governance is a part of this constitutional process. As a discourse, according to our central thesis, the concept is a part of the search process of emerging post-Fordist politics and the latter's scientific and nonscientific substantiation.

## **2. Julie L. Owen: Human rights as civil religion: the glue for global governance**

Julie argues that human rights serve as a civil religion. I have not yet received her paper...

## **3. Heikki Patomäki: Problems of democratising global governance: Time, space and the emancipatory process**

Heikki begins by wondering that if we criticize global governance as a concept, we would need to search for alternative conceptualizations. However, if we do this, it means we have to address questions of change. Change seems to be difficult, he muses, so perhaps asking questions about change involves asking questions about power. And this, of course, leads to questions about accountability and democracy.

Therefore, he starts out by re-reading David Held's *Democracy and the Global Order* (1995) and then critiques it from a post-structuralist and critical-realist perspective. He uncovers the metaphors that structure Held's cosmopolitan solution (Lakoff and Johnson 1999) and finds that these are not neutral descriptions but hidden political (euro-centric) choices (linear time; spatial representation). He then

finds similarities between the Kantian conception of a perpetual peace and Held's cosmopolitan democracy. After focusing on the two concepts of space (deconstructing sovereignty as an essential category) and time (since the world is an open not a closed system there can be no linear account of world history) he offers his presupposition for making the world a better place: a pluralist security community, which "consist[s] of geo-historical interdependent social systems which do not prepare for the use of collective violence against each other." This can be achieved through emancipatory research and concrete utopias. Or in his own words,

...In this paper, I have argued for re-setting the co-ordinates for the emancipatory process of global democratisation. Any change is conceived as movement in space. The re-setting of co-ordinates concerns where we are now, where we should be going and how to get there. We are not somewhere between the Westphalian and the Charter models, moving towards the model of cosmopolitan democracy. Rather, the first coming-together of humanity occurred in terms of the European empires and capitalist world economy. This was made possible by industrialisation in the core which yielded unprecedented productive and destructive capabilities to the new sovereign states and colonial and capitalist companies...

...A necessary condition for a global movement towards something better is the development of a global, and pluralist, security community. A security community consists of geo-historical social systems in which actors do not prepare for the use of political violence against each other. Integration generates the non-preparedness for the use of political violence and helps to sustain a security community. Integration consists of a sense of community and dependable expectation of peaceful changes. The development of a security community is a long and complicated process of institutionalisation of mutual acceptance, trust and procedures and practices of peaceful change, and it is always vulnerable to escalation of conflicts. The more centralising an attempted large-scale political community is, the more risks there may be.

#### 4. Fleur Johns: The Globe and the Ghetto

Fleur sensitizes us for the political moves underlying the seemingly neutral discourse of global governance and for the conscious and unconscious production and reproduction of power relationships on the academic and policy level. She argues that the practice of considering and practicing global governance “is marked by conventions of inclusive segregation and aspirations for authority.” She re-reads three articles on global governance (Coffee 1999; Falk and Strauss 2000; Slaughter 2000) that focus on economic, democratic, and juridical global governance and then juxtaposes them with 16<sup>th</sup> Century Venetian writing on “worldliness”, thereby unearthing the paradox the current global governance discourse is grappling with, that in order to achieve global completeness we need to cultivate the divergent. In her own words:

...The field of writing on global governance is characterized in this paper as a field of scholarly action and cultural conflict staged at sites such as the CPOGG conference. This paper describes some of the conventions shared by those occupying this field, focusing on governance as a mode of orthodoxy rather than of regulation or institutionalization. In particular, it examines the work of three leading legal scholars writing about global governance. Among the conventions identified in their work are orthodoxies of inclusive segregation. In order to evoke the possibility of future convergence, these writings draw qualitative distinctions between those within the global fold and those whom global governance is yet to embrace, while drawing all into their narratives. Moreover, these contributors to the global governance field seem to internalize these categorizations as they reproduce them in their work. They are as much colored by their classification within the field of global governance work as they are classifiers of this field. Hence, the hierarchies presented as incontrovertible in much global governance writing – such as that between “democratic” and “non-democratic” places and people – are neither innocently factual nor rooted in some malevolent intent. These classifications (and the conflicts that they fuel) are being created and recreated, in relatively mundane and often well-intentioned ways, over the course of writing, reading and talking about global governance. They are, in part, a product of the routinized aspiration for coherence. Global “world order” and the direction and divisions attributed to it are incidental byproducts of the desire for such an order and for status within it. This critique will be rendered more concrete by comparing selected writings on global governance to some sixteenth century Venetian accounts of worldliness. This comparison will foreground some

specific struggles that have, in the past, yielded belief in an overarching framework of worldwide reach. Impulses apparent in Venetian writings on worldliness, this paper suggests, have counterparts in contemporary work in global governance. We may, moreover, learn strategically from this juxtaposition. As in the congested streets of Venice, there may be few occasions for purity, rightness or detachment when working in the global governance field. Wherever we stand within it, we are likely to be, in some sense, compromised by or complicit in that which we would oppose.

## **5. Helena Alviar: The modernizing project in Colombia: an unfinished goal?**

Helena analyzes how the concept of modernity has been implemented in Colombia. She argues that the classical interpretation tells us that a state is modern if it has (a) a liberal democratic system, (b) is moving towards industrialization, and (c) secularization has been achieved. In Colombia, these aspects have been translated into the legal system, however, have modernizing impact on the political, social, and economic system. She argues there are three competing explanations: (a) special interests that have captured the political system, (b) skeptics that argue modernization is not a goal that should be achieved, and (c) optimists arguing that modernization is on its way. She then focuses on the history of the Colombian Modernization project and finds an increasingly complex understanding of modernization in the Colombian constitutional discourse. In her own words:

...This paper challenges the mainstream interpretation that although all of the elements of modernization – a political revolution, meaning a liberal, democratic system; a socio-economic transformation, defined as the path away from agricultural dependence and the move toward industrialization; and a cultural break, understood as a move away from tradition, the secularisation of the educational system and the separation of church and state- have been designed as legal transformations, Colombia has been unsuccessful in reaching modernity. It is my opinion that none of the elements of modernity have been truly incorporated to Colombian society. Instead, these modernizing ideals have been translated into laws -through constitutional changes, economic development plans and educational reforms-, which have become a way of understanding the Colombian context and have become an ideology in the sense that they

encompass “the set of beliefs, ideas, and values embodied in the legal institutions and legal materials...of a particular society”. In this sense, there is a partial ideal of modernization translated into norms (giving the legal system an instrumental role) that has given the appearance of unfulfilled but existent goals. The general agreement that these goals are part of the legal institutions, has either distorted reality or marginalized alternatives.