Problems of democratising global governance: 
Time, space and the emancipatory process

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Introduction

Criticism of global governance leads to the search for alternatives. Would it be possible to make systems of global governance more responsive to the most salient problems of humanity such as poverty and oppression, ecological threats and disasters, and the enormous destructive powers of modern weapons systems? How could the systems of governance be made more responsive? Would it be possible the break the dual hegemony of neo-classical economics and the United States and refashion the principles of global economic governance? What should these alternative principles be?

Some may conceive the problem of responsiveness only at the level of substantial policies. If we only could change the priorities of and available resources to, for instance, developmental or environmental policies, things would turn out much better. Or, perhaps the main problem is to substitute a better economic theory for the false orthodoxy of neo-classical economics?

This raises the question of change. There seem to be obstacles to changes. Not everything is possible. Twenty-five years of reports on better global governance has not really resulted in better governance. Perhaps at the heart of the problem lie relations of domination and mechanisms of power that would somehow seem to prevent changes from happening? Perhaps those social forces arguing for changes are not powerful enough? Perhaps the relevant relations of power should be restructured to make actors more equal? Perhaps the weaker actors should be empowered? In other words, perhaps global governance should be democratised?

Many have also realised that the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s - including making the United Nations (UN) system financially accountable, turning the GATT into the WTO, and using the debt problem to consolidate the supremacy of the Bretton Woods institutions - have amounted to further
deepening and entrenchment of neoliberalism. By regulating and controlling
governments, neoliberal global governance delimits the area of democratic
decision-making within states. If this is seen as a problem, there are two
main possibilities. Either global governance should be reduced in scope and
power, or democratised, or both.

The quest to democratisate global governance is thus emerging as the key
issue of world politics. However, this quest involves deep conceptual
problems. What does democratic governance mean? How could we get from
the current situation towards a more democratic system of global
governance? How could we maintain and develop the would-be democratic
system of governance? Indeed, who are ‘we’, where should ‘we’ be going
and what should ‘we’ do to get there?

Perhaps the most articulate response to the quest to democratisate global
governance is the theory of cosmopolitan democracy, as developed by David
Held and his associates (Held 1991; 1995; Archibugi & Held 1995;
Archibugi, Held & Köhler 1998; McGrew 1997; Holden 1999). Held has
developed in great detail a model of cosmopolitan democratic governance to
be realised in multiple layers (from global to local) and exercised by
democratised, overlapping authorities.

In the following I shall discuss the problems of Held’s account of
cosmopolitan democracy and lay out a critical realist alternative to it. The
focus will be on assumptions about time, space and the emancipatory
process. Although Held’s way of framing the problem and in particular some
of his concrete proposals remain useful, the spatio-temporal assumptions of
his model are deeply flawed. What is needed is a realist theory of peaceful
democratic emancipation as an open-ended process.

The model of cosmopolitan democracy

What is democratic governance? David Held (1995: 145-6) maintains that
essentially democracy is about collective self-determination by equal and
free citizens, about ‘autonomous determination of the conditions of
collective association’. Citizens ‘should be able to choose freely the
conditions of their own association’ and determine the ‘form and direction of
their polity’. This implies certain rights and obligations from the side of
citizens and ‘a common structure of political action’ that is ‘a “neutral” basis
of relations and institutions which can be regarded as impartial or even-handed with respect to their personal ends, hopes and aspirations’ (Held 1995: 153-6).

Held’s (1995: 99) basic argument for extending the reach of the principles of democracy beyond state governance is that ‘there are disjunctures between the idea of the state as in principle capable of determining its own future, and the world economy, international organizations, regional and global institutions, international law and military alliances which operate to shape and constrain the options of individual nation-states’. Over time, due to globalisation, the discrepancy between (i) the idea of democratic self-determination within a nation-state and (ii) the realities of regional and global flows and transnational sites of power has grown worse. Moreover, state capabilities have also been undermined.

Territorial boundaries are therefore arguably increasingly insignificant in so far as social activities and relations no longer stop – if they ever did – at the “water’s edge”…. The intensification of regionalization and globalization, particularly in the post-Second World War era, has contributed simultaneously to an expansion of the liberal democratic state’s functional responsibilities and to an erosion of its capacity to deal effectively alone with many of the demands placed upon it. (Held 1995: 121)

Figure 1 illustrates the assumptions of traditional democratic theory and makes the fundamental problem of national-territorial democracy very clear (Held 1995: 224-5). Mainstream democratic theory has assumed a symmetrical and congruent relationship between the allegedly representative political decision-makers and the recipients of political decisions, at two crucial points. The assumption is that both accountability and the consequences of decisions are confined to citizens in a delimited territory. In other words, democratic theory has been based on the metaphor of a territorial state as a spatial container, with a clear-cut inside/outside distinction.
Figure 1 Assumptions of symmetry and congruence

Decision-makers: representatives, leaders etc

Accountability

Output (decisions and their consequences)

Citizen-voters ——————————————————— The people in a bounded territory

Held sets the contemporary realities against this metaphor. In the multilateral and often hierarchical systems of regional and global governance, decision-makers are legally and/or politically accountable for their decisions not only to their citizens but also to the international organisations such as the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO or to other states. There are also crude power-political forms of de facto accountability, such as those based on the institutions of great powerness and spheres of influence (e.g. Central American and many other states such as Philippines vis-à-vis the US or, during the Cold War, Finland or many African and Middle Eastern states vis-à-vis the Soviet Union); and de facto accountability based on financial dependency (e.g. governments vis-à-vis the credit rating agencies and short-term financial investors).

Moreover, the territorial borders of states do not bind the impact of decisions or their often unintended consequences. (Inter)dependencies of all sorts ensure that many decisions have impacts across borders, some on neighbouring states (e.g. a Soviet-era nuclear reactor next to a border), some regionally (e.g. the Hidrovía Paraguay-Paraná, a navigation project along the rivers that flow across various boundaries between Mercosur countries), some globally (e.g. US monetary policies). Many states and other actors
such as MNCs are positioned in such a way that whatever they do will have widespread impacts, independently of their intentions (this is one of the senses of the term ‘structural power’).

Under these circumstances, it seems obvious that the ideals of autonomy and democracy can only be realised in a cosmopolitan setting. Since many sites of power are transnational or international, ‘democratic public law within a political community requires democratic law in the international sphere’ (Held 1995: 227). Inspired by Kant, Held (1995: 227) calls this cosmopolitan democratic law, which he conceives as a ‘necessary complement to the unwritten code of existing national and international law, and a means to transform the latter into a public law of humanity’.

Held develops a detailed model of cosmopolitan democracy. It ‘is a system of diverse and overlapping power centres, shaped and delimited by democratic law’ (Held 1995: 234-5). The first step towards making this model real would be to develop the UN system to live up to its Charter and also beyond, by extending the mandate of the Charter. The main point would be to cultivate the rule of law and impartiality – thus challenging the current prevalence of double standards – in international affairs. (Held 1995: 269) The first step is, however, clearly insufficient:

This governance system would …. remain a state-centred or sovereignty-centred model of international politics, and would lie at some considerable distance from what might be called a “thicker” democratic ordering of global affairs. Furthermore, it would lie at some distance from an adequate recognition of the transformations being wrought in the wake of globalization – transformations which are placing increasing strain on both the Westphalenian and Charter conceptions of international governance. (Held 1995: 270)

Thus more generally, the first priority is to establish components of cosmopolitan democratic law, for instance by extending the reach of international courts and changing the constitutions of national and international assemblies. Moreover, Held also envisages the widespread use of transnational referenda and the establishment of a global assembly (a world parliament), first alongside the UN system. Although only a ‘framework-setting institution’, the global assembly could become ‘an authorative centre for the examination of those pressing global problems
which are at the heart of the very possibility of the implementation of cosmopolitan democratic law’, such as health and disease, food supply and distribution, the debt problem and the instability of global financial markets (Held 1995: 274). Held’s plan also includes the strengthening of civil society and regional organisations as well as democratisation at various sites of power, including those of the global political economy.

Last but not least, Held also argues that ‘it is dangerously over optimistic to conceive the cosmopolitan model without coercive powers, because tyrannical attacks against democratic law cannot be ruled out’ (Held 1995: 276).

**Post-structuralist interrogations: Is the model of cosmopolitan democracy just another potentially dangerous political blueprint?**

The post-structuralist suspicion is that the model of cosmopolitan democracy is just another modern political blueprint. As such, it is also potentially dangerous. Held’s cosmopolitan solution is based on the liberal distinction between rightness (justice) and goodness: ‘Democracy has an appeal as the “grand” or “meta-political” narrative in the contemporary world because it offers a legitimate way of framing and delimiting the competing “narratives” of the good ’ (Held 1995: 282). In fact, he goes even further and claims that:

> ...without a politics of coercion or hegemony, the only basis for nurturing and protecting cultural pluralism and a diversity of identities is through the implementation of cosmopolitan democratic law: the constructive basis for a plurality of identities to flourish within a structure of mutual toleration, development and accountability. (Held 1995: 283, italics added)

But this ‘only basis’ would presuppose that cosmopolitan democratic law is neutral with respect to different values. This kind of procedural universalism is problematic. There is no neutral procedure. The idea of cosmopolitan democracy as the ‘grand meta-narrative’ thus gives rise to suspicions in many different ways. First, the project of cosmopolitan democracy is, amongst other things, about building a sense of identity of citizenry as a whole. Then the problem becomes one of transforming people and collective actors to accord with the preferred democratic world order. It is also clear that there will/would be differences between the states and areas with respect
to their progress towards the requirements of the model of cosmopolitan democracy and that many actors might also straightforwardly oppose such a development.

The ideal of cosmopolitan democracy might then give rise to a definition of higher and lower beings – others – located territorially in different parts of the world. This implies moral and political distance from the different others (on the axes of self-other relations, see Todorov 1984: 185). The others may then be treated as innocents to be converted, as amoralists to be excommunicated or simply as outsiders (the far-away anti-democrats) who can impose a threat of violence on us, i.e. the potential enemies. (Cf. Connolly 1989: 325). Thus there also arises the perceived need for coercive powers to ‘protect’ the territory of cosmopolitan democracy.

Moreover, although the move from a national-territorial definition of democracy towards the ‘all-affected’ principle seems right, the ‘all-affected’ principle takes the form of instituting new, permanent, territorial layers of government – adding regional (e.g. the European Union) and global (e.g. a reformed and democratised UN) to local and national layers (see Saward 2000: 34). It is for this reason that Walker (1995: 34), for instance, complains that whole edifice of cosmopolitan democracy is based on a simplistic hierarchical account of layers, giving rise to a ‘great chain of

Figure 2 The hierarchy of territorial layers in the model of cosmopolitan democracy

GLOBAL

Regional

National

Local
beings’ metaphor, but at first assuming the form depicted in Figure 2. In this model, the principles of representation and accountability remain territorial, although the territorial scope is expanded to cover the world as a whole – or at least the democratic part of the world.

It is thus plausible to suspect that the spatial assumptions behind the model of cosmopolitan democracy are similar to the territorial and exclusive notions of political community and space to those of the territorial state. As Connolly (1995: xxii) argues, ‘territory is sustaining land occupied and bounded by violence. By extension, to territorialize anything is to establish exclusive boundaries around it by warning other people off’.

There is a further problem. Held’s model of cosmopolitan democracy also makes standard Western assumptions about linear world historical time. The assumption of linear time can be explicated as follows. There are two universal primary metaphors that conceptualise states of affairs and changes in terms of basic spatial movements: (i) ‘Remaining In A State Is Going In The Same Direction’; (ii) ‘Changing Is Turning’; and (iii) ‘Long-Term Activities (Projects) Are Journeys’. At the time of the French Revolution, an additional deep assumption emerged: History is expected to be a movement towards something better, towards the ultimate destination (for the relevant conceptual history, see Koselleck 1983). Together these three primary metaphors and the deep Enlightenment assumption constitute a vision of a linear world historical time. The specific form that this vision assumes in Held’s model of cosmopolitan democracy is depicted in Figure 3. Note that as Better Is Up, the movement is also from lower to higher levels. This also gives rise to the hierarchy of beings (‘great chain of beings’).

A consequence of this conception of linear time is a twofold eurocentrism. Firstly, the history of Europe is simply presented as the history of the entire world. It is not only that the great American or African or Eastern – including Chinese and Indian – civilisations have no role to play in this account. It is also that the ‘era of centralised nation-states’ is an abstraction and idealisation of some selected European and, later, American experiences only. The expansion of the capitalist world economy and the complicated colonial practices of rule are ignored, although they were essential parts of the complexes that led to the original European expansion and to the gradual
Figure 3 Linear time in the theory of cosmopolitan democracy

The era of centralised nation-states
- centralised control of means of violence & territory
- clearcut inside/outside
- Westphalenian system

The era of cosmopolitan democracy
- Globalisation erodes nation-states (UN Charter as a transition era)

Medieval era
- multiple overlapping authorities with weak administrative capabilities

and dialectical transformations elsewhere on the planet (see Barkawi & Laffey 2001). Secondly, as a special instance of this eurocentrism, cosmopolitan democracy comes to be modelled on – and is also idealised and abstracted from – the process of European integration. Indeed, Held’s model has been explicitly inspired by the European integration process, although he does not always acknowledge this in his theoretical texts.4

By exposing these simple, misleading and also potentially dangerous assumptions of time and space, post-structuralist interrogations shed a shadow of suspicion over the entire project of building ‘cosmopolitan democracy’. However, Connolly, Walker and other post-structuralists do not necessarily oppose the idea of global democracy per se. To the contrary, Connolly (1991; 1995: Ch. 5), in particular, has been among the first to question the territorial assumptions behind the standard accounts of democracy, arguing that democracy should be de-territorialised and globalised; also Walker (1993: Ch. 7) has explored these issues.

Moreover, Connolly in particular has also taken some steps towards outlining a more concrete alternative. Instead of providing a detailed blueprint of future institutional arrangements, he advocates a strategy based on (i) democratic politics of disturbance of the relations of identity and difference on which any territorial state is founded; and (ii) mobilising and
legitimising those ‘democratic energies already exceeding the boundaries of the state’ (Connolly 1995: 149ff.). Connolly thus focuses on the ethical problems of the open-ended process of global democratisation. He also emphasises that democracy is also a cultural condition that ‘encourages people to participate in defining their own troubles and possibilities’ (Connolly 1995: 153). Democratic theory cannot stay outside this open-ended process, imposing its own categories and visions upon others (including those literally or metaphorically outside modern Europe), instead of engaging with the categories and aims of concrete people and movements.

**A critical realist interrogation: the consequences of the split between moral reason and the world**

From a critical realist perspective, there is a further problem in the cosmopolitan theory of democracy. In many ways, Held’s account of cosmopolitan democracy merely up-dates and complements Immanuel Kant’s moral theory of peace and human development. Thus Held has inherited the Kantian dichotomy between moral reason and the phenomenal world. Held’s basic argument can be summarised as follows:

**HELD:** RG (reality of globalisation) & IA (ideals of autonomy) \(\rightarrow\) CD (cosmopolitan democracy)

In this inference, the implication (\(\rightarrow\)) also includes a moral obligation to realise the model of cosmopolitan democracy. The argument is analogical to Kant’s argument for perpetual peace:

**KANT:** SW (Hobbesian ‘state of war’) & IA (ideals of autonomous reason) \(\rightarrow\) PP (perpetual peace)

Logically, this seems to imply the need for a new social *contract* that once and for all would establish the desired state of global affairs (perpetual peace or cosmopolitan democracy). Kant in fact had the idea that an international conference should be convened to establish the legal principles of perpetual peace and the league of nations. Although Held distinguishes between short- and long-term objectives, he must have something similar in his mind, for at present only sovereign states can enact international law.
Kant’s ontological dilemma stems from his acceptance of the empiricist account of social reality. Following David Hume, Kant thought that science is about a systematic analysis of regular sense-impressions of contiguity and succession between A and B. It was thus assumed that the world of phenomena consists of constant conjunctions between As and Bs (both usually seen as external things, although in principle empiricism denies that we could know that there is anything beyond our own perceptions). In contrast, (moral) reason is autonomous and free and, by implication, disembodied. There is thus a split between the world and moral reason.

Kant’s problem was that moral reason can do very little to change determinist chains of constant conjunctions in the world of phenomena. So what practical use was his argument for perpetual peace? Kant was thus at pains to demonstrate that it is at least possible to assume a teleological ‘cunning of nature’ that will lead towards the formation of a league of nations and that there all kinds of ‘secret mechanisms’ that would eventually help to establish and maintain the legal order of perpetual peace.

Held seems to be repeating the fundamental antinomies of Kant. However, his theory is in fact thinner than Kant’s in its response to the suspicion ‘that may be true in theory but is of no practical use’ (cf. Kant 1983 [1793]). Held is concerned with detailed prescriptions about how global governance should be organised but has very little to say about who could (or would like to) realise his vision, under what circumstances, and with what consequences. There are only two brief passages in his Democracy and the Global Order that would seem to address this problem. They make essentially the same argument:

To lay out the objectives of a cosmopolitan model of democracy is not to claim that they can all be immediately realized – of course not! But who imagined the peaceful unification of Germany just a few years ago? Who anticipated the fall of the Berlin Wall and the retreat of communism across Central and Eastern Europe? The political space for a cosmopolitan model of democracy has to be made – and is being made by the numerous transnational movements, agencies and institutional initiatives pursuing greater co-ordination and accountability of those forces which determine the use of globe’s resources, and which set the rules governing transnational public life. (Held 1995: 281)
This argument consists of two parts: (i) surprises are possible; and (ii) there are already actors who pursuing goals compatible with those of the model of cosmopolitan democracy. However, besides being rather vague about the reasons to believe that a fundamental global transformation towards the desired direction is possible, Held also remains silent on how his vision could or should be realised in practice.

Held’s silence is not an accident, but a direct consequence of the Kantian antinomies inherent in his account. A criticism of these antinomies is not an argument against global democracy per se. It is, however, an argument against totalising blueprints that are not grounded in realist analysis of the relevant context, its concrete embodied actors, its social relations and mechanisms, and its transformative possibilities.

**Bringing real geo-history back in: time, space and the process of peaceful democratic emancipation**

Held’s starting point is mostly well-taken. Democracy is also about collective self-determination by equal and free citizens, about ‘autonomous determination of the conditions of collective association’. As Held says, the conventional assumptions of symmetry and congruence do not hold. Even in Western Europe, territorial states have never been spatial containers, with a clear-cut inside/outside distinction. Territorial societies and states have developed as parts of wider wholes, in particular the international society and expanding capitalist world economy. Moreover, Held is probably also right in claiming that recent developments – often associated with the vague catchword ‘globalisation’ – have made a real qualitative difference (cf. the debate between Hirst & Thompson 2000 and Perraton 2000).

Held’s model of cosmopolitan democracy is nonetheless built on misleading, even if deeply rooted, accounts of time and space, which tend to give rise to problematic and potentially violent self-other relations. Moreover, repeating the antinomies of Kant, the model does not include any account of transformation from here (= somewhere in between the Westphalenian and Charter systems) to there (= cosmopolitan democracy). In fact, because the designated endpoint of this journey appears problematic and ill-defined, are there really good reasons to start this particular journey in the first place? Or would it be better to define the co-ordinates of the movement towards global democratic governance in terms drastically different to those of Held’s?
Indeed, there is an alternative. A critical realist conception time, space and peaceful process of democratic emancipation can overcome the simple territorial spatiality, linear history, potentially dangerous self-other relations and Kantian antinomies of the model of cosmopolitan democracy. What emerges instead of a model of cosmopolitan democracy is a vision of an open-ended process of global democratisation produced causally by concrete – embodied and relational – actors, who will also have to address the problem of violence in their own categories and being. This vision presupposes another project, namely that of building a global security community. It also presupposes the possibility of world politics in the wide sense of the term.

Space

The first notion to be overcome is the mythical view that, once upon a time, the world was governed by exclusive sovereign states which were like spatial containers, with strict inside/outside borders. A few modern sovereign states evolved in Western Europe in the 17th and 18th century (with parallel but dependent developments in North America), a few others elsewhere in the Americas and Europe in the 19th century. In the wake of the French Revolution and the global success of European modernisation, some non-European empires in decline such as Turkey and China or feudal societies such as Japan started to mimic European developments and build similar state structures in the course of the 19th century.

At the time when Kant articulated the international problematic, the principle of free trade was already legitimising both the further expansion of capitalism and the British Empire (and also to a lesser extent, other European Empires). Moreover, in the 19th century, the sustenance of order was not only based on conservative power-balancing policies. The concert of conservative great powers was meant, first and foremost, to discipline and marginalise potential or actual European revolutionaries and rebellious nationalists. Moreover, trade, the Gold Standard and the transnationally operating European financial system maintained the 19th century order.6

Hence, even within Europe, the very basis of the fragile 19th century ‘order’ was built on social relations that in no way followed the neat inside/outside distinction. Besides, most sovereign states emerged in the course of the 20th
century, due to the disintegration of the vast European Empires. The
disintegration of these Empires was caused by world war(s) and the related
processes of decolonialisation. This did not, however, create a world of
exclusive spatial containers called ‘nation-states’.

It is generally the case that rules, relations of authority, and systems of
domination do not follow the principle of territoriality. John Ruggie (1998:
192-7) describes the late 20th century non-territorial economic ‘region’ of the
world vividly. He argues that states continue to engage with external
economic relations with each other. The terms of these engagements are
largely set in systems of multilateral governance.

In the nonterritorial global economic region, however, distinctions
between internal and external once again are exceedingly problematic,
and any given state is but one constraint in corporate strategic
calculations. This is the world in which IBM is Japan’s largest
computer exporter, and Sony is the largest exporter of television sets
from the United States. It is the world in which Brothers Industries, a
Japanese concern assembling typewriters in Bartlett, Tennessee,
brings an antidumping case before the US International Trade
Commission against Smith Corona, an American firm that imports
typewriters into the United States from its offshore facilities in
Singapore and Indonesia. It is the world in which even the US
Pentagon is baffled by the problem of how to maintain the national
identity of “its” defense-industrial base.
(Ruggie 1998: 196)

The non-territorial economic ‘region’ of the world is rule-governed. Some
fundamental rules, such as private property rights, originate in the 17th
century expansion of the capitalist world economy. Others are sedimented in
various historical layers. The Bretton Woods system, which was created
during World War II, regulated economic activities in detail and also created
new organisations, the IMF, the World Bank and the GATT. In the early
2000s, the economic policies of many dozens of countries, particularly in the
Southern hemisphere, are directly dictated by the IMF and the World Bank.
The GATT has been turned into the WTO, which has, despite widespread
resistance and the failure of the Seattle WTO summitt, an ever-increasing
mandate to regulate the terms of any economic activities anywhere. The
global financial markets re-emerged in the 1970s and have consequently
given rise to new heteronomic relations of domination, which have also been
rendered into the service of reviving the hegemony of the US. The global financial markets are also governed multilaterally, in part in the IMF, but to a large extent by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). (See e.g. Patomäki 2000; 2001: Ch. 3).

Many or most parts of contemporary contexts of action across the globe are causal products of relational complexes that exist neither merely ‘inside’, nor merely ‘outside’, the state borders. Modern sovereign states are thus best seen not merely as real collective actors but also as open social systems with structural differences and asymmetries, co-constituted and determined by relational complexes that are often difficult to locate exclusively in the inside or outside. The past, outside and relations to other beings are massively – but in a complicated manner – present in any social being, including concrete embodied actors and collective actors such as states (see Bhaskar 1993: 54, 199-200). Hence mutual interconnectedness and collective self-determination are much deeper and complex problems than indicated by the model of cosmopolitan democracy. The principle of territoriality – even when enlarged to cover a larger part of the surface of the planet earth – may thus be quite off the mark.

*Figure 4* Mechanisms of democratic governance

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This insight seems to question the idea that the ‘all-affected’ principle must take the form of instituting new, permanent, territorial layers of government – adding regional (e.g. the EU) and global (e.g., a reformed and democratised UN) to local and national layers. Are there alternatives to this way of thinking about the spatiality of global democracy?

Saward (2000) has argued that there are many possible mechanisms of democratic governance, permanent territorial layers being only one of them. Figure 4 (from Saward 2000: 39) distinguishes between four different possibilities. In Figure 4, the vertical axis accounts for whether decision mechanisms are permanent or temporary; the horizontal axis for whether the mechanism concerned is primarily informal and non-governmental or formal and governmental. For instance, global parliament and courts would fall within category B. Cross-border referenda could be employed as type B or type D mechanism, depending on the issue and legal framework. Some of the special UN conferences are typical type D mechanisms. However, the more intensive and extensive is the involvement of non-governmental organisations and movements, the closer these would get to C and A.

Importantly, Saward (2000: 40-4) also discusses deliberative forums (involving a microcosm of a larger political community meeting to deliberate in depth on issues and also having a formal say in decision-making); reciprocal representation (of national or regional parliaments); identity-based representation (seats allocated to identity-categories such as language or religion, rather than people within territorial areas); and complex accountability (separating participation and accountability and respecting organisational autonomy) as devices that would ‘enshrine the all-affected principle further than Held envisages’. Although these arrangements are clearly attempts to mix and fuse territorial areas in complex and innovative ways, they do not fall neatly into any of the categories of figure 4.

Moreover, although useful up to a point, figure 4 is deficient also for other reasons. There is no reason to think that permanent or semi-permanent governmental structures (B) must be inclusive territorial layers (the lower one adding up to and being included in the higher ones). Modern social worlds are functionally differentiated. Most of the existing international organisations are functional rather than territorial. Different functional organisations have different memberships, consisting of states and non-governmental organisations. In other words, their membership may be
overlapping but it is not identical, inclusive or exclusive. Also new organisations can be founded. Whether old or new, any of these organisations can be (re)constructed on various democratic rules and principles. Logically, what would emerge is a non-centralised, non-territorial and non-exclusive system of complex global governance. It might even be possible to think about co-ordinating, say, global economic policies of states and these organisations without creating an over-arching territorial layer above all these other spaces and layers of global governance. Yet, the co-ordinating body could nonetheless be a global representative assembly.

Time

Perhaps the most crucial ontological distinction of critical realism is that of closed vs. open systems. In closed systems – mostly found only in laboratories where scientists have artificially created closures – no qualitative change within the causal mechanisms occurs and nothing external intervenes in the working of the system. Predictions are possible only in closed systems. Where qualitative changes and/or external interventions are ubiquitous, predictions are not possible (see Bhaskar 1979: 11-14; Sayer 1992: 121-125).

There are no causal closed systems in society. This implies that the future – including the future of humanity – must remain open. It also undermines belief in any particular account of linear world history. However, the linear history depicted in Figure 2 is not really a prediction. It is simultaneously a sketch of the past and an attempt to envisage a possible and desirable future. Together the past and the future are conceived as a continuous single path journey from one location to another. Is this scheme plausible?

Figure 2 fails as an interpretation of the past because the European expansion there were multiple largely independent or separate paths for different parts of humanity living in different continents, cultivating different – although in many regards also similar – cultures or civilisations. When these paths came gradually together over the centuries of expansion of capitalism and European imperial states, it did not result in a simple imposition of the abstracted and idealised system of mutually exclusive nation-states, i.e. ‘the Westphalian system’. The other pasts of humanity did not disappear without leaving a causally efficacious trace of any kind. To the contrary, what emerged was a complex dialectical interplay of resistance and
attempts to appropriate and modify the European – and later Western – modernity to fit various local circumstances (in some cases with disastrous results).

One of the reasons for the spread of nationalism and state sovereignty was that they provided a legitimate platform for fighting the imperial rule and capitalist exploitation that the majority of humanity experienced outside the core regions of the world economy (cf. Linklater 1990: 67-72). Instead of an inevitable and universal ‘phase’ in the single path of human development, the spread of state sovereignty was thus an outcome of the first coming-together of humanity under the rule of industrialising capitalism and the European empires that represented themselves at home, as it were, as ‘national sovereign states’.

History remains open and thus multiple paths are open from any specific location (state of affairs). Past struggles can always be reopened in new present contexts which may be more favourable to the possibilities that were previously suppressed; new combinations of the existing elements of social contexts can be invented and innovated; new social forces can emerge; and also genuinely novel elements may be innovated and fed into the processes of present and near-future political struggles. In one sense it is almost megalomaniac to impose one possible and desirable future upon all the transformative possibilities that open at the current outset of world history. Thus it seems that Figure 2 also fails as a prescription for the future.

Figure 5 is an attempt to draw a more plausible picture of world history. The grey ellipse of Figure 5 represents the coming-together of separate paths of humanity (cf. also the philosophical argument of Patomäki 2002a). Obviously, the figure fails to display the asymmetry of this integration. It can only represent the separate timings of integration and metaphorical ups and downs of different cultural parts of humanity. However, the thickest arrow in the middle represents the European and later Western modernisation towards which other cultures have thus far moved (although in some regards there have been transformations also the other way round).
World history should be analysed as an open process, in which choices of actors do make a difference, sometimes to the intended direction, but often also not. Many world order models have had far-reaching – and sometimes destructive – unintended consequences. (Cf. Alker 1981; Alker, Biersteker & Inoguchi 1989). As the future is open, there can be an overall movement upwards or downwards. Within any wide, overall path, there are possible criss-crossing paths for separate yet deeply interconnected cultural parts of this whole (which of course would not remain unchanged through these journeys). A totally (self-)destructive conflict is possible, as is development towards better. A particularly apt metaphor to grasp the possible development towards better might be that of gradual unfolding of progress. While the social world is frequently dilemmatic (Sayer 2000: 163), and while we usually cannot see very far from any given point, in the ideal world of mutually reinforcing and cumulative reforms, humankind may triumph over anything we can now imagine (see Patomäki 2002b: 158-60). Progress – in terms of global democratisation – is thus possible without any linear conception of time or final destination.

The presupposition: a pluralist security community

There are reasons to suspect, on the basis of systematic studies of past states and federations, that the imposition of a common government, with its capability of violent enforcement of norms, may well decrease rather than
increase the chances of peace (Deutsch et al. 1957; see also Adler & Barnett 1998). It is much easier to establish a pluralist security community than an amalgamated security community presupposed by would-be global assembly or any other permanent and centralised governmental structure. A pluralist security community does not require unitary or universal governmental bodies, decision-making centres or machineries for enforcement (Deutsch et al. 1957: 3-11; Lijphart 1981). At any rate, the building of any kind of security community is a long and complicated process of institutionalisation of mutual acceptance, trust and procedures and practices of peaceful change, and it is always vulnerable to escalation of conflicts. The more centralising an attempted large-scale political community is, the more risks there may be.

The conditions for collective context-transformation are, perhaps increasingly, not only regional but also global. We should expect this to have effects on the possibility of the emergence and maintenance of security communities in various parts of the world. Even more far-reaching, we can also talk about the possibility of a global security community. I have elsewhere argued that the key to understanding and explaining the possibility of security communities lies in the self-transformative capacity of contexts, generating dependable expectations of peaceful changes and integration (Patomäki 2002b: 200-2). To put it as simply as possible: contexts differ in their openness to change, and this is crucial for the emergence and maintenance of a security community. The question thus emerges: to what extent do the emergent global rules and relations have self-transformative capacity? One indicator is whether preparations are being made for war against (potentially) deviant or context-challenging groups or states within the global community. It is also matters whether actors categorise themselves as parts of a wider whole. Among the relevant actors, is there a shared belief in the existence of a global community?

A security community may require agreement on a number of things, and may lead to collective identity-formation. Any sense of community can develop and harden into a will. The preparedness to use violence is typically based on the necessitarian assumption about the unchangeable essence of both oneself and the others (perhaps enemies). The self-transformative capacity of contexts has epistemic implications: it is not compatible with illusions and mystifications about, or reifications and naturalisations of social realities. Conversely, the denaturalisation of understandings can contribute to the openness and responsiveness of the community.
Figure 6 situates critical social sciences in the complex that is capable of generating a security community. First, there is the definition of a security community. A security community consists of geo-historical social systems in which actors do not prepare for the use of political violence against each other. Mere separate indifference is not enough for a community. There must be some real interdependence of elements of the systems. Integration generates the non-preparedness for the use of political violence. Integration generates and helps to sustain a security community. Interdependence as such does not imply integration. Integration consists of sense of community and expectation of peaceful changes.

Figure 6 Generation of a security community

Emancipatory research is also situated in Figure 6. Various unjustified psychological rationalisations and ideological mystifications of social structure support the (re)production of those structures (Bhaskar 1986: 194). Critical realist explanations tend to work for enhancing the self-transformative capability of contexts by criticising untrue naturalisations, reifications, and fetishations of social being and related mystifications of knowledge; by making arguments for peaceful transformations; and by creating mechanisms of reflective learning. At a deep level, criticisms may also concern, say, the alienation and oppression characteristic of capitalism.
— and the essentially related international problematic. Any relevant relations and practices can be revised. More straightforwardly, social scientific research can also propose concrete utopias that either presuppose or concern building or maintaining a security community. Typically, this opening up of various global contexts for peaceful changes — for increasing the self-transformative capacity — amounts to global democratisation.

**The non-violent logic of explanatory emancipation**

The basic scheme of explanatory emancipation is simple (see Patomäki 2002b: Chs. 5 and 6). First, in order to explain something specific and concrete (there has to be a well-defined research problem and *explanandum*), researchers have to engage with social meanings and assume a dialogical relationship with relevant actors or traces and evidence of history, including texts and quantified observations. Only with dialogically understood data can social episodes, practices, relations and processes be studied adequately and in sufficient detail.

Mere understanding is not enough. There is a quest for deeper analysis of layers of meanings and causes for the presence of particular efficacious parts in the relevant social context. Causally explanatory models can and should rely also on holistic metaphors, historical and other analogies, and various social scientific theories. The best available explanatory model is often different from prevalent understandings. Consequently, in the second stage, explanatory models may not only turn out to be critical of the understandings of the lay actors but also take steps towards explaining them.

Theories or discourses that are in some important regards false can, nonetheless, be necessary for the reproduction of practices and relations. False understandings and related structures are unduly limiting human possibilities. Now, if some of the central beliefs of a discursive formation are in some essential regards false, and if one possesses an explanation of the reproduction of this discursive formation, the quest to remove or transform the corresponding practices follows. The normative force of this argument is based on the recognition that truth is a regulative metaphor, which has normative force. Truth is a human judgment, which is based on a *metaphor* of correspondence that suggests a resemblance between theory-dependent statements, on the one hand, and the presupposed differentiated, structured, layered and relational reality, on the other.
Any critical judgement must be subject to the limitations and constraints of the condition of epistemological relativism. Rational truth judgements must be dialogical and cannot imply the denial of their own presupposition. This is particularly important in contexts in which the transformation of politics into violence is more than a mere abstract and remote possibility. A consistently relativist critical realist must attempt to avoid reproducing – or for that matter, building – structures of cultural violence, which legitimise also direct violence. Any critical theory must be willing to analyse the violence inherent in its own categories. When critical explanatory arguments are turned into political praxis, first preference should be given to reciprocal communicative action. Moreover, strategic political action has to be non-violent and remain open to mutual communication.

The critical realist logic of explanatory emancipation is contextual, concrete and implies non-violence in the sense that it involves critical reflection upon and disturbance of those categories – including one’s own – that may constitute or generate violence towards others. Nonetheless, as social scientists, we can derive ethico-political judgements from truth-judgements. Hence, as virtuous scholars, we may have a moral obligation to change those practices and relations, which presuppose false theories and discourses.

**Concrete utopias**

Truth is a necessary, but not sufficient, guide to action. Social criticism presupposes the possibility of better practices. However, while a blueprint for the future may be visionary, it may also be an indicator of mistaken optimism. A romantic intellectual may be trying to find ground for her or his high ideals, and thus starts to believe either that the many aspects of the ideal are already actual (‘beautiful soul’) or that it does not really matter whether the ideal world is realisable (‘unhappy consciousness’).

In contrast, a concrete utopia is a model of practical and institutional arrangements that does not currently exist, but should be politically possible to achieve, and feasible as an alternative way of organising social practices and relations. The realisation of a concrete utopia involves practical wisdom; lessons drawn from past or contemporary models; counterfactual reasoning about the possible effects of an altered context; as well as thought-
experiments about the consequences of the transformed practices and systems. (See Sayer 2000: 160-5)

Practical wisdom is an Aristotelian intellectual virtue, a state which allows an actor who attains it to be able to ascertain what is ethico-politically good, and then to deliberate about how best to reach that good. This calls for knowledge about the concrete political situation, and a systematic reflection on the conditions of action. It also involves ascertaining what would be a better, yet feasible set of practices or parts of a system.

Lessons drawn from the past or present practices may provide ‘drafts’ or models for transformative projects, whether successful or not. (Sayer 2000: 162-3) The lack of success of a particular practice or project could have been dependent on the particular geo-historical context in which it originally occurred. What would have been the possible effects of a somewhat different context? Is it possible to build components of a complex that would make something similar more feasible in the future?

Instead of well-intended illusions, there has to be a careful analysis of the world historical context of political action. This analysis has to take into account the relevant rules, resources, embodied actor-identities and -competencies, structures and mechanisms. What kinds of social forces could be expected to support a change? What would the feedback and possibly cumulative effects of a reform be? Are there any indications of a potential backlash against the reform? What new possibilities would be opened up by this particular reform?

Reform proposals may be conservative and exclusive. A proposal may take the existing institutional arrangements and social and technical division of labour for granted. Institutional conservativism leads each group to identify its interests and ideals with the defence of its particular niche. (See Unger 1998: 11-12; 44-8; 109; 164-9) Other approaches are transformative and solidaristic. They propose ways of realising the interests and ideals through the step-by-step change of a set of arrangements (Unger 1998:11; 222-3).

For instance, a currency transactions tax organisation (CTTO), if organised innovatively and democratically, should strengthen the autonomy of states to decide upon their monetary policy, and also provide them with a part of the tax revenues; give Southern states the majority of votes in deciding upon the management of the tax and preparing the budget of the global fund; while
also giving representatives of national parliaments and global civil society a powerful voice in influencing the use of substantial global funds e.g. for developmental purposes. CTTO would also create a new forum for democratic associations in world politics – albeit initially confined to regulating and transforming an aspect of global financial markets – and thereby enable the development of new political alliances and thereby further realistic initiatives.8

It is important to analyse whether a concrete global democracy initiative is based on an institutionally conservative idea of ‘piecemeal social engineering’, or whether it aims at institutional change. At face value, institutional conservatism may appear more ‘realistic’. This may be an illusion, however. Institutional innovations may overcome the politics of compromises between narrow and short-sighted group interests. This is something that cannot be decided a priori, but has to be analysed concretely and in a detailed manner, case by case.

Conclusions

In this paper, I have argued for re-setting the co-ordinates for the emancipatory process of global democratisation. Any change is conceived as movement in space. The re-setting of co-ordinates concerns where we are now, where we should be going and how to get there.

We are not somewhere between the Westphalian and the Charter models, moving towards the model of cosmopolitan democracy. Rather, the first coming-together of humanity occurred in terms of the European empires and capitalist world economy. This was made possible by industrialisation in the core which yielded unprecedented productive and destructive capabilities to the new sovereign states and colonial and capitalist companies.

This coming-together of humanity meant, however, that a multiplicity of different times – both as developmental ups and downs and as identity-constituting narratives – began to exist in the shared global geo-historical space. Interconnectedness of human beings assumed a new global reach, in the context of uneven developments and imperial relations of domination.

Sovereign statehood emerged as a key resource in the struggles over recognition of agency and autonomy. The consequent recognition – during
the world war in the 1940s – should not be confused with the illusion that sovereign states have been or are spatial containers, with a clearcut inside/outside distinction. Social relations – always involving power as transformative capacity – are no more territorially bound than they were in the era of European empires. The new technological facilities, productive and destructive powers and the project of neoliberalism have ensured that in some regards a territorially confined ‘society’ may now be even more of an illusion than it was in the past. The first global recognition of universal agency and autonomy should be seen as the beginning of world history proper. The struggles over agency and autonomy continue, in constantly changing world historical settings. This is where we are at the moment.

How should we then conceive possible movement forward? As the future is open, there can be an overall movement upwards or downwards. Within any wide, overall path, there are possible criss-crossing paths for separate yet deeply interconnected cultural parts of this whole (which of course would not remain unchanged through these journeys). A totally (self-)destructive conflict is possible, as is development towards something better.

A necessary condition for a global movement towards something better is the development of a global, and pluralist, security community. A security community consists of geo-historical social systems in which actors do not prepare for the use of political violence against each other. Integration generates the non-preparedness for the use of political violence and helps to sustain a security community. Integration consists of a sense of community and dependable expectation of peaceful changes. The development of a security community is a long and complicated process of institutionalisation of mutual acceptance, trust and procedures and practices of peaceful change, and it is always vulnerable to escalation of conflicts. The more centralising an attempted large-scale political community is, the more risks there may be.

Contexts differ in their openness to change. Contexts consist of structured settings of actors, their actions, rules, resources and practices, implicating internal and generating external social relations. For instance, consider those contemporary institutional arrangements that govern global trade or production or finance and their underpinnings such as private property rights, which have been reconceptualised as elements of ‘good governance’. How open are these contexts to changes? How responsive are the corresponding organisations to any demands that deviate from the neo-imperial rules and principles of economic liberalism?
The development of a pluralist security community and global democratisation are very closely linked. In many cases, an increase in the self-transformative capacity of contexts amounts to democratisation. However, an attempt at global democratisation may not be conducive to the development of a global security community. This is one of the reasons why it is so important to tackle the questions who ‘we’ are and where are ‘we’ heading and also address explicitly also the problem of cultural violence.

In this paper, I have argued against totalising blueprints that are not grounded in realist analysis of the relevant context, its concrete embodied actors, its social relations and mechanisms, and its transformative possibilities. ‘We’ is relational. In any concrete context self-other relations are both materially grounded (i.e. embodied and presuppose material resources) and dynamic (i.e. learning and changes take place in interaction with others). Both explanatory social criticism and the design of concrete utopias have to take this general condition as their starting point.

Explanatory social criticism is based on truth judgements. Rational truth judgements are and must remain dialogical. If this norm is not respected, also trust, the prerequisite of a security community, may be undermined. Moreover, a concrete utopia has to be based on the recognition of the multiplicity of geo-historical actors, the frequently dilemmatic nature of social realities, and the ubiquity of unintended consequences of actions. Instead of writing straightforward blueprints, the task is thus to analyse realistically the transformative possibilities of different world political contexts as well as the feasibility and real consequences of different concrete models (for a systematic analysis of global democracy initiatives from this perspective, see Patomäki & Teivainen 2002).

All this lays down sufficient co-ordinates and establishes a direction for movement towards a less violent and more democratic world. However, the final destination must remain radically open. The problem is: Is this notion too vague (‘a journey without a final destination?’) and unconventional (‘isn’t new better than old and progress about anticipating a better future?’) to be understandable and acceptable? Not necessarily. Global security community and democracy are concrete and ambitious destinations, even when they are seen in processual and contingent terms. Moreover, there is a lot of commonplace knowledge about exciting and dramatic figures such as explorers and scientists who try to move beyond the edges of what is
currently considered possible, without knowing their final destination. It is in this sense that we should conceive the gradual unfolding of progress.

REFERENCES


ENDNOTES

1 In the 1960s and early 1970s, Rom Harré developed many of the central notions of critical scientific realism, including the basic ideas of *ontological realism* such as the reality of structures, layers and causal powers; the crucial ontological distinction between *open and closed systems*; and the condition of *epistemological relativism*, involving also the acknowledgement of the crucial role metaphors and analogies play in science. In critical realism, epistemological relativism is coupled with the possibility of comparing theories and making *rational judgements* about their relative merits. Alongside Harré, also Mary Hesse, Mario Bunge and others were important in forging these new ideas about science. Harré’s work was a considerable influence on Roy Bhaskar, whom Harré also supervised. In his works, Bhaskar (1975, 1979, 1986) has forcefully argued for ontological realism, epistemological relativism and judgmental rationalism. However, the term ‘critical realism’ was not coined before the late 1980s. For a collection of ‘essential readings’ of critical realism, see Archer et al. 1998. For further developments in the context of IR, see Patomäki & Wight 2000; and Patomäki 2002b.

2 I have slightly amended his argument by interpreting ‘accountability’ from a wider perspective of critical power analysis in global political economy.

3 Here I follow George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1999), who in their brilliant study of ‘the embodied mind and its challenge to Western thought’ analyse the way reason is based on prototypes, framings and metaphors, which have a very concrete material basis in our body and neural structures of our brains. ‘The mind is not merely embodied, but embodied in such a way that our conceptual systems draw largely upon the commonalities of our bodies and of the environments we live in’. (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 6) Cultural differences stem from the particular, historically variable common sense knowledge associated with specific cases and the multiple ways complex metaphors are built. A metaphor is notified ‘X Is Y’ (all with capital letters).

4 However, in passing, Held (1995: 113), does compare the conditions of Europe and the rest of the world: ‘Although the challenge to national sovereignty has perhaps been more clearly debated within the countries of the European Union than in any region of the world, sovereignty and autonomy are under severe pressure in many places’. On the EU as an ideal, see also Archibugi (1998: 220).

5 There are some interesting tensions, however. By applying Kantian arguments in an intellectual context dominated by the critical theories of the early and later Frankfurt School (cf. Held 1980), Held (1995) in fact recasts them and at times approaches more scientific realist lines of argument. In particular, in chapter 11 Held argues against many liberal theories of democracy because they ignore or marginalize the importance of the effects of real power mechanisms of global political economy. After this discussion, the straightforward legalist (Kantian) discussion of the last chapter 12 seems quite astonishing.

6 This is one of the great insights of Karl Polanyi (1957/1944).

7 From Patomäki (2002b: 204).
I have developed this concrete utopia in more detail in my book *Democratising Globalisation. The Leverage of the Tobin Tax* (Patomäki 2001). With Lieven A. Denys, I have also devised a fully-fledged “Draft Treaty on Global Currency Transactions Tax” (Patomäki & Denys 2002), which is now (autumn 2002) being discussed and amended by a number of global civil society actors.

Besides economic liberalism, which revolves around the entrenchment of private property rights, the concept of ‘good governance’ includes also some elements of political liberalism and even republicanism. For an analysis and attempt to turn this notion towards the assessment of the governance of global political economy, see Patomäki 1999.