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**The Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign:
Addressing a Global Issue within the U.S. Political System**

Preventing the proliferation and use of Russian nuclear weapons and materials and finding peaceful employment for former Soviet weapon scientists are the most serious challenges to global security today. But despite these threats, international and regional organizations and the governments around the world have been derelict in their duty to help Russia fully account for and secure these weapons, and ultimately eliminate the likelihood that they will fall into the hands of terrorist organizations or proliferate to other states.

The Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign (NTRC), formed in early 2001, takes an innovative approach to addressing this problem. NTRC educates and mobilizes key constituencies to advance public policy that reduces the threat posed by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. NTRC, which is funded primarily by private donations, is guided by the notion that the first step to meeting the threat is directly engaging the U.S. government to encourage the acceleration of efforts of the United States, its allies, and friends to assist Russia in downsizing, securing, and, where appropriate, disposing of elements of the bloated post-Soviet nuclear complex.

Unlike traditional nuclear threat reduction groups which concentrate primarily on public education, NTRC works directly with members of the U.S. Legislative and Executive branches to convince them to support policies that will steadily reduce the threat of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The idea which became NTRC was born during discussions in the fall of 2000 between former U.S. Senator Alan Cranston and Bobby Muller, President of the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation—a central player in the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and co-recipient of the Nobel Prize in 1997. Sen. Cranston, a committed nuclear abolitionist, believed that a group working within the U.S. political system in a bipartisan fashion could make headway in a debate which had become very polarized over the previous years. Today, NTRC continues to be guided by that philosophy: using pragmatic

means to forge a centrist position within the U.S. political system that supports innovative steps to reduce the nuclear threat.

THE PROBLEM NTRC ADDRESSES

As the events of September 11, 2001, and subsequent anthrax attacks, exhibited, the end of the Cold War did not eliminate the threat of nuclear and biological weapons. Poorly accounted for and insecure WMD around the world increases the likelihood of a catastrophic attack by terrorists or terrorist states on the United States, deployed U.S. troops, U.S. allies, or citizens of the world in general.

Russia possesses 95 percent of the world's nuclear weapons and materials outside of the United States. Specifically, Russia maintains an estimated 20,000 nuclear warheads in addition to possessing 130 tons of plutonium and 970 tons of highly enriched uranium—enough to build at least 60,000 additional warheads. Unfortunately, Russia is unable to reliably account for this huge stockpile, having inherited a sub-standard accounting system from the totalitarian Soviet state. Compounding the problem, each year Russia devotes approximately 1/50th the amount of resources that the United States does to ensuring that nuclear weapons and materials do not proliferate. A recent CIA report faulted the security of Russian nuclear arsenal facilities, stating that "undetected smuggling has occurred." In addition, Russia has thousands of tactical nuclear weapons that exist in numbers and locations of which the United States is unaware.¹ These weapons, because of their size and greater portability, are highly desirable to terrorist groups or nations. In October 2001, the U.S. government became very concerned that al Qaeda may have smuggled a 10-kiloton nuclear warhead into New York City. If placed in a major metropolitan area, such a device—small by U.S. and Russian standards—would probably kill 250,000 people, seriously injure tens of thousands more, and render a large area uninhabitable for decades to come.

In addition, Russia and the United States each have thousands of nuclear warheads ready to launch in mere minutes. At the same time, Russia's early-warning and nuclear command systems are deteriorating badly. The CIA has reported that equipment controlling Russian nuclear weapons frequently malfunctions, and critical electronic devices and computers sometimes switch to combat mode for no apparent reason. Many of the radars and satellites intended to detect a ballistic missile attack are no longer operational. The danger of a Russian launch through miscalculation could suddenly become much more likely if control of Russian nuclear weapons were to be stressed by an internal or international crisis.

Insecure fissile materials at hundreds of sites across the globe is another prominent global security threat. During the Cold War, the United States and Russia gave considerable quantities of fissile materials to nuclear sites across the globe that used them for research. Now, decades later these materials are in danger of being stolen from facilities that are not capable of ensuring the physical security of the materials.

¹ There are reports that Russia cannot even account for all of its tactical nuclear weapons.

The necessity of securing these weapons and materials at their source is highlighted by the fact that once proliferation has occurred detecting nuclear weapons or materials would be incredibly difficult due to the relative ease of concealment.

RECENT EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM

Fortunately, some encouraging steps have been taken recently to address these acute problems. First, in May 2002, Presidents Bush and Putin signed the Treaty of Moscow which promises to cut U.S. and Russian strategic weapons by 2/3 within 10 years. Second, this June, the members of the G-8 agreed to devote \$20 billion collectively over the next ten years to reducing the threat of Russian nuclear weapons and materials. Third, in August, the U.S. and Russian governments, with some financial support provided by the privately-funded Nuclear Threat Initiative, spirited about three nuclear bombs' worth of material out of Yugoslavia. The material was returned to Russia, the source of the material decades ago, and will now be converted into non-weapons grade material.

But much more needs to be done.

NTRC believes that the Treaty of Moscow is a significant step in the right direction, but that, even if it is fully implemented, the United States and Russia will not have liquidated the legacy of the Cold War, as President Bush claims. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) Chairman Joseph Biden has made clear his hopes that this agreement is “not the end of the ride.” NTRC shares this opinion. Agreeing to a two-thirds reduction in the number of deployed strategic warheads in ten years does not mean, unfortunately, that the threat of nuclear terrorism has been addressed, nor does it mean that a new, cooperative U.S.-Russia strategic relationship has been fully formed.

The ironic fact is that in some ways the Treaty could complicate the task of preventing nuclear terrorism. Unless they are securely stored or destroyed, removing warheads from launch vehicles in Russia could actually increase the possibility of nuclear weapons or materials falling into the hands of terrorists or aggressive states. To help the Senate ensure that the promise of the Treaty of Moscow is fulfilled, NTRC is urging the Senate to include conditions in the resolution of ratification that it reports that strengthen the Treaty. (Appendix A contains a detailed description of NTRC's suggested conditions.)

As it relates to the \$20 billion that the G-8 has promised to devote to cooperative threat reduction efforts with Russia, this amount falls \$10 billion short of the funding level suggested by the bipartisan Baker-Cutler Task Force. In its final report in January 2001, the Task Force found: “The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-useable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home.” The Task Force provided a plan for securing and accounting for Russia's weapons and materials over the next 8-10 years and argued that for approximately \$3 billion/year the problem of loose Russian nuclear weapons and material could be basically put to rest within 8-10 years. (The United States already devotes about \$1 billion/year to these programs.) Despite the warning provided

by the events of September 11, 2001, the G-8 is promising to devote 2/3 of the funds necessary to properly address the threat posed by the Russian arsenal. NTRC is working to increase this funding level.

As it relates to efforts to secure nuclear materials at sites across the globe, some members of the U.S. House of Representatives are still balking at the idea of allowing \$50 million per year—an economical sum compared to the problem faced—to be spent on this crucial effort. NTRC is working to convince members of Congress from both sides of the aisle and in both chambers to support these worthwhile efforts.

The risks to American and world security from the diffusion of advanced technologies, along with weakened state controls over borders and international commerce, are encouraging a dramatic structural and budgetary reorientation within the United States. A profound social and political transformation is underway, epitomized, unfortunately, by the resurgence of discussion of old security instruments, such as civil defense and “usable” nuclear weapons, along with newer and futuristic concepts such as the attempted American military domination of space. But, ultimately, these issues and NTRC’s work transcend national boundaries and require more cooperative forms of global engagement. The magnitude of the problem is such that public and private efforts initiated within the United States, innovative and compelling as they are, are insufficient to manage the compelling threat posed by the decline of the Russian nuclear weapons complex. Loose nuclear weapons have the potential to kill millions of people. In an era of global interconnectedness, the impact of a nuclear detonation in one state would profoundly affect life in every other state on the planet. The fate of Russian nuclear weapons is one problem that requires new, inventive cooperative approaches.

As the possessor of 95 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons and materials outside of Russia, the United States plays a pivotal role in, and has special responsibilities for, preventing the proliferation of WMD and in leading the way toward the liquidation of the WMD legacy of the Cold War. It is critical to build on the strong foundation of broad knowledge and concern developed through years of work by traditional public policy institutions, including non-governmental organizations, and to ensure that U.S. policymakers are fully educated, and more deeply concerned, about these important issues. Timely, regular communication from key constituencies about the need for the United States to play a pro-active role in reducing these threats is necessary to convince policymakers to support legislation that protects Americans and the other citizens of the world by taking steps that will reduce these dangers.

NTRC’s APPROACH

In 1995, the Commission on Global Governance suggested in its final report, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, that “The international community should reaffirm its commitment to eliminate nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction progressively from all nations, and should initiate a ten-to-fifteen year programme to achieve this goal.”

The report went on to suggest: “Work towards nuclear disarmament should involve action on four fronts:

- the earliest possible ratification and implementation of existing agreements on nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction;
- the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT);
- the conclusion of a treaty to end all nuclear testing; and
- the initiation of talks among all declared nuclear powers to establish a process to reduce and eventually eliminate all nuclear arsenals.”²

While the NTRC is supportive of general thrust of the Commission’s suggestions and is pleased that the NPT has been indefinitely extended, the Campaign is designed to work toward such longer term goals by raising awareness within the United States and Russia that the two countries still maintain nuclear arsenals far in excess of their basic national security needs and have operational practices that risk a catastrophic nuclear exchange as a result of accident or miscalculation—even with the Cold War over ten years past.

There will certainly be those who will argue that the NTRC’s approach—seeking pragmatic and effective steps within the U.S. political context to steadily reduce the threat of nuclear weapons—is too limited and that work should be focused on international efforts that call for an immediate elimination of all nuclear weapons. For instance, *Our Global Neighbourhood* clearly states: “Gradual measures are no longer sufficient.”³ While NTRC supports those who seek to effect policy change using such approaches, the Campaign believes that for positive steps to be taken on this front it will be necessary first to convince policymakers in the United States—many of whom are greatly suspicious of any calls, domestic or international, to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons—that U.S. national security will be strengthened by reducing the U.S. arsenal of nuclear weapons. Policymakers must be convinced that this step will, in turn, increase the likelihood that Russia will reduce its nuclear arsenal, thus decreasing the likelihood that terrorist groups or other states will acquire nuclear weapons or expertise from the huge Russian nuclear arsenal. Only after the idea of reducing nuclear weapons gains greater salience within the U.S. political context will it be likely that U.S. policymakers will actively consider steps that might be taken to fulfill the U.S. pledge as a signatory to the NPT “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

Groups such as NTRC that hope to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons are fighting an uphill battle because of the widespread belief within the United States that nuclear weapons prevented World War III and that a large nuclear arsenal, with many weapons ready to launch at a moment’s notice, are vital to ensuring U.S. national security. NTRC is designed to increase the level of engagement on this issue by elected Members of Congress who hitherto have been largely prevented from having any input into the size, composition, or operational plans for U.S. nuclear weapons. As former U.S. Senator Bob

² The Commission on Global Governance, “Our Global Neighbourhood,” (1995), chapter 7, accessed on 1 September 2002 at: <http://www.cgg.ch/contents.htm>.

³ The Commission on Global Governance, “Our Global Neighbourhood,” (1995), chapter 3.

Kerrey from Nebraska has repeatedly pointed out, even though he served as ranking member on the Senate Intelligence Committee, he never received an official briefing on the basic elements of the U.S. nuclear targeting plan—the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP). (According to one report, "nobody outside a small military circle has seen it (the SIOP)."⁴) Clearly, something is amiss when U.S. elected representatives are not allowed to have oversight over one of the most significant elements of U.S. defense policy.

One of NTRC's primary aims is to make this issue directly relevant to more constituencies and to create new stakeholders. Those who work directly on national security issues understand the importance that reducing WMD threats plays in protecting commerce, trade, etc. However, it is not always obvious to those engaged in regulating and promoting commerce that WMD threat reduction should be among their primary concerns. For this issue to garner the attention it merits, it is important to work within the traditional national security communities, and also to engage those communities not traditionally focused on threat reduction issues—such as the business community in general, and the banking, real estate, insurance, and international trade communities.

To encourage change, the NTRC uses the tools of a modern U.S. political campaign: accomplished lobbyists, pollsters, media consultants, online communications experts, as well as nuclear weapon analysts.

The Campaign also seeks to serve as the focal point for groups that have been working for years on reducing the nuclear threat. NTRC supports, as appropriate, the activities of groups with similar goals. In addition, NTRC is working to widen the circle of those interested in increasing cooperative efforts with Russia by enlisting the support of retired military and religious leaders, celebrities and musicians.

In a short period of time, NTRC has demonstrated an ability to build strong, effective relationships with policymakers; these relationships have resulted in meaningful reforms including increased funding for Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs administered by the Department of Defense and the nuclear non-proliferation programs at the Department of Energy and the Department of State. The bipartisan relationships that NTRC is cultivating are also laying the groundwork for improved bipartisan support for an enhanced threat reduction agenda.

NTRC's online outreach has mobilized thousands of ordinary citizens across the country who are now educating their communities and regularly engaging their Congressional representatives on these important national security issues.

In sum, NTRC's unique approach focuses on galvanizing bipartisan Congressional as well as grassroots support to implement pragmatic measures that will steadily reduce the threats posed by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

⁴ Bret Lortie, "A Do-It-Yourself SIOP," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July/August 2001, Vol. 57, No. 4, pp. 22-29.

A detailed description of NTRC's goals and objectives for 2002–2003 and the means that will be employed to achieve them follows.

NTRC Goals and Objectives for 2002–2003:

Increase issue saliency among policymakers, elite decision-makers, religious leaders, targeted organized grassroots constituencies, and media outside the Washington, DC beltway.

- Educate policymakers on the need to tackle this top priority issue, including an assessment of the dangers facing the United States now and realistic solutions that will reduce them. This will include packaging and disseminating existing information in a format that legislators and their staff can read and react to. It also means providing them with any expertise, facts, or other information they need to legislate or speak on this topic and with statements and releases they can use.
- Increase the number of articles written on the topic that focus on the need to adopt strong legislation to reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction.
- Increase the number of editorials and letters to the editor calling for Congress to make this a priority issue.
- Increase the number of voices calling directly on the federal government to lead on this issue, including business coalitions, non-governmental organizations, select local and state government officials, retired military and former defense/intelligence officials, and religious leaders.
- Increase the number of candidates and elected leaders who issue formal statements supporting a threat reduction legislative agenda.
- Conduct tracking polls to chart Americans' support for having members of Congress propose and pass threat reduction laws and share this information with lawmakers who may wish to support the NTRC agenda.
- Continue and expand online outreach. The vast reach and immediacy of the Internet allows us to access supporters who would have been either impossible or expensive to reach through other media, and to deliver personalized messages about the issue and what people can do in real time. This ability to educate constituents about issues and mobilize them to express their views to Members of Congress has repeatedly demonstrated its value as a tool in both advancing the issues and improving NTRC's relationship with Members of Congress.

Make reducing the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons a central issue in the homeland, economic and national security debates.

- Expand the political coalition committed to addressing this issue. Currently there are too few elected leaders who are champions of threat reduction. NTRC aims to increase that dramatically, building a moderate, bipartisan group that demands that addressing this issue be a higher priority in the 108th Congress.
- Increase the number of bills and amendments offered that would reduce the threat.
- Increase the number of constituency groups who have a defined position of support for a threat reduction legislative agenda, (e.g., League of Women Voters, AARP).

Promote legislation and policies

While the above goals and objectives fall under the public awareness and education categories and will take up a large portion of NTRC's time and resources, in order to effectively achieve our goals, NTRC must move from education to activation to legislation.

- Work with legislative allies to write and advance legislation that supports a threat reduction agenda, including increased funding for and improved efficiency of programs that secure and reduce arsenals of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and materials; and reducing the chances of a Russian or other nuclear launch through accident or miscalculation.
- Support/co-sponsor strategies to showcase bi-partisan support for bills/amendments.
- Lobby members to get favorable votes on important legislation.
- Collaborate with interfaith and other groups to mobilize and activate their grassroots constituencies to lobby their members at key times to win important legislative victories.

Increase media attention inside and outside-the-beltway in support of threat reduction.

To help drive action by policymakers on accounting, securing and reducing weapons of mass destruction, NTRC will implement a media outreach plan that targets the press outlets that they care most about—their hometown papers, local radio and television news programs. NTRC's media team will go directly into districts and work with the outlets, particularly the major dailies, to educate them on WMD threat reduction issues. Where possible, NTRC's media team will work to ensure that Members of Congress receive recognition for action they are taking to advance public policy in this area.

Equally important, NTRC's media team will continue our work with Congressional press secretaries to ensure they have the resources and communications support they need.

Providing this support has worked extremely well in building relationships and helping short-staffed Congressional press offices get recognition for their Members.

While outside-the-beltway media will be a priority of our outreach campaign, NTRC's media team will also work with inside the beltway trades such as *Defense News*, *Energy Daily*, *The Hill* and *National Journal*, which are read by Hill policy staff.

When issues arise that are attracting national media attention, NTRC's media team will fully engage with them to make sure that Members who are taking leadership positions on our issues are getting the credit they deserve.

Target Audiences:

- U.S. Congress. NTRC will recruit and assist a bipartisan group of lawmakers in both the Senate and House on pertinent committees to be champions of threat reduction issues.
- Executive branch. NTRC will target separately political members and career members. This category will include departments and agencies, as well as the White House and especially the National Security Council.
- Validators. NTRC will reach highly-respected people who agree that reducing these threats should be our primary national security goal. NTRC will focus on retired military, former defense/intelligence officials, think tanks (across the ideological spectrum), religious leaders, foreign policy experts, business leaders, and others whom our targets find persuasive.
- Outside-the-beltway media and inside-the-beltway trade media. To make sure our priority audience hears our message, NTRC will work to ensure that supportive Members of Congress are getting regular, positive coverage in home districts and states across America. Many groups focus on framing the story for the media elite in Washington and New York. NTRC will focus on educating the media and generating thought-provoking pieces about the need to reduce the threat outside the beltway. As a way to reach members and their staff directly, NTRC will also target inside the beltway trades, such as the *Congressional Quarterly*, *National Journal*, *Defense News* and *Roll Call*.
- Specific organized constituency groups. NTRC will identify a minimum of 20–30 special interest groups that will be most persuasive to our principal targets (Congress and the Administration) and courting them as allies and partners. NTRC will ask them to support our legislative agenda, and use their influence with Members to lobby them when appropriate. NTRC will also provide turn-key educational materials for them to share with their members to build a dedicated constituency that knows and cares about this issue.

- Other allied groups. As always, NTRC will continue to reach out, and find ways to work with existing arms control, non-proliferation, and religious groups. NTRC aims to make sure that our efforts to educate and mobilize policymakers benefit the many groups that have worked for years on these issues.

NTRC will develop and tailor key messages for each of our target audiences. Our working messages are as follows:

Message Points

The single greatest threat to our national security is that a nuclear, biological or chemical weapon will fall into the hands of a terrorist or terrorist state intent on doing us deadly harm.

The facts are alarming.

- Russia retains approximately 20,000 nuclear warheads and enough nuclear weapons material to make at least 60,000 warheads more.
- At present, Russia cannot comprehensively account for all its nuclear weapons and materials.
- Russia has thwarted over 600 attempts to acquire nuclear material.
- It would be essentially impossible for a properly concealed nuclear weapon to be detected.
- There are more than 20,000 former Soviet scientists who know how to make nuclear or biological weapons and can aid terrorists and terrorist states building rogue bombs.
- Russians have weaponized thousands of tons of viruses, toxins and bacteria including: anthrax, smallpox and the plague.
- While there are concerns that Iraq might acquire nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, multiple “Saddam Husseins” or “Osama bin Ladens” could be created if even a small fraction of Russia’s weapons arsenal proliferates.

While so many other potential threats to our nation’s security remain nameless and faceless, accounting for, securing and reducing weapons of mass destruction CAN be accomplished by our leaders.

Failure to act jeopardizes all our lives.

As the world’s sole remaining superpower, and the leader of the free world, the United States is the only nation capable of leading the international community cooperatively in

the war against terror and in ensuring weapons and dangerous materials will not fall into the hands of those who wish us deadly harm.

We can significantly reduce this threat by accounting for, securing and reducing weapons of mass destruction worldwide and particularly in Russia where the vast majority of this loose deadly material exists.

The improved U.S.-Russian relationship makes this an opportune time to ensure that action is taken. Our leaders have an obligation to keep weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists and terrorist states by cooperating with other members of the international community to enact strong threat reduction and non-proliferation programs.

These programs could be funded using approximately one percent of the funds the U.S. spends on national defense each year.

If enacted, the United States, working cooperatively with the international community, can eliminate the proliferation threat in Russia within 10 years and greatly reduce threat from elsewhere.

NTRC policy agenda:

**The Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign (NTRC):
Strategy for Cooperative Global Security**

1. Account for, Secure, and Reduce Nuclear Weapons and Materials

Account for:

- Develop a comprehensive global inventory of nuclear warheads and fissile material – starting with the United States and Russia.
- Develop an inventory of U.S. and Russian tactical nuclear weapons.

Secure:

- Expand Department of Energy International Materials, Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) and other Nuclear Nonproliferation programs beyond the Russian Federation.
- Accelerate Cooperative Threat Reduction and related programs to deal with warheads that are no longer operationally deployed under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
- Promote the consolidation of nuclear materials in fewer locations across Russia and elsewhere.
- Promote heightened international standards for security of all nuclear weapons and materials at their source.
- Accelerate global cleanout of nuclear materials at vulnerable sites.
- Find new funding sources to quicken the pace of securing weapons and materials in Russia.
- Promote the development of improved nuclear detonation detection technologies.

Reduce:

- Accelerate blend-down of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) in Russia.
- Eliminate production of plutonium in Russia.
- Promote debt reduction for Russian non-proliferation efforts.
- Strengthen the nuclear/conventional weapons firebreak by not developing nuclear weapons which destabilize international non-proliferation and threat reduction efforts.
- Ensure the prompt and effective implementation of the G-8 Global Partnership Against Weapons of Mass Destruction.

2. Build a Cooperative Strategic Relationship with Russia.

Eliminate Remnants of the Cold War:

- Support the strengthening, ratification and more rapid implementation of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty.
- Support destruction of the maximum feasible number of both U.S. and Russian warheads consistent with the minimum number required for security —and associated launch vehicles-removed from operational deployment under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty.
- Extend Presidential decision-making time for the launch of nuclear weapons.
- Continue the shut down of Russian nuclear weapons production facilities.
- Expand cooperative dismantlement of nuclear-powered, non-missile submarines in Russia.

Forge New Relationship:

- Encourage joint U.S.-Russian early warning systems.
- Encourage U.S.-Russian cooperation in the area of missile defense that increases confidence and transparency.
- Promote establishment of an effective U.S. Congress-Russian Duma Nuclear Threat Reduction interparliamentary exchange program.
- Find new funding streams to accelerate U.S.-Russia nuclear threat reduction and non-proliferation efforts.
- Encourage private sector partnerships to finance draw down of surplus Cold War armaments such as the Megatons to Megawatts Program.

3. Reduce the Threat of Chemical and Biological Weapons.

Strengthen international coordination:

- Support major funding increase to implement the Bilateral Destruction Agreement with Russia under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
- Support the development of strong and effective monitoring techniques for the Biological Weapons Conventions (BWC).

- Encourage the development of a coordinated strategic plan within the U.S. government to manage the threat of chemical and biological weapons without impinging on civil rights.
- Encourage the sharing of information on global patterns of disease outbreak in support of the BWC.

Monitor and reduce stockpiles:

- Encourage the expansion of export controls to the full Chemical Weapons Convention schedule 3 chemicals.
- Encourage fulfillment of U.S. P.L. 106-113 requirements to conduct trials of biological weapons monitoring technologies and the development of new chemical weapons and biological weapons monitoring capabilities.
- Ensure that the United States and Russia are working as rapidly as possible to destroy Russian chemical weapons stockpiles.
- Encourage greater U.S.-Russia scientific cooperation to increase transparency and reduce uncertainty.
- Find new funding streams to enhance U.S.-Russia chemical and biological weapons threat reduction and non-proliferation efforts.
- Build private sector partnerships to increase transparency and reduce the brain-drain threat in the former Soviet Union.

Activities to support goals and objectives:

The following is a list of activities that NTRC is currently planning to pursue.

Ongoing activities that will occur weekly, monthly or bi-monthly in each quarter.

- Education packets to members of Congress and to targeted Administration and Department/Agency staff monthly.
- Weekly blast fax to Capitol Hill highlighting topical issues central to the NTRC agenda.
- Online outreach to continue to raise public awareness and mobilize interested supporters to take action.
- One briefing panel per quarter that focuses on a specific issue that is currently on the radar. Invitees will include policymakers and Congressional staffs.
- Build and engage a coalition of policy think tanks, organizations, including religious leaders and business leaders, to update on policymaker activities and identify opportunities to tailor and disseminate information generated from coalition members to policymakers.
- Meet with grassroots organizations to identify opportunities for individuals to contact policymakers about supporting a threat reduction platform, making specific asks.
- Run quarterly poll of public opinion measuring the public's concern with and desire to reduce the threat of WMD.

- Outside-the-Washington, DC-Beltway media education and coverage generation.
- Draft crisis plan to use IF there is a nuclear, biological or chemical accident or attack. This will serve as our blueprint and will be reviewed each quarter for adjustments.
- Produce turn-key materials on our legislative efforts for allies, policymakers and media to use to reach Members, constituents and readers/viewers, respectively.
- Support legislation moving through the Congress in ways most helpful to Members.

Benchmarks of Success:

- Passage of key components of NTRC legislative agenda.
- Commitment from specific Members to move and/or support our legislative agenda in the 108th Congress.
- Have our educational packets ranked above a 3 on a scale of 1–5, based on a random sampling of 20 staff.
- Increased coverage in target metro markets (note, NTRC will measure this by determining the amount of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon coverage in the six months prior to our efforts).
- Well-attended briefing panel.
- Increase number of local “e-activists” committed to WMD threat reduction and increased number of activists engaging in Action Alerts.
- Ensure coalition and grassroots meetings yield information about a variety of reports that NTRC can package for our targeted policymakers.
- Coalition and grassroots members express willingness to help us push our legislative agenda in the last few weeks of the Congressional session.
- Increase coalition both vertically and horizontally—increased number of traditional arms control groups involved, and increase the number of non-traditional organizations and associations that make arms control a priority.
- Increased number of members committed to working with NTRC on threat reduction legislation.
- Commitments from non-traditional allies to begin to work on NTRC issues.
- Increased membership of the speakers bureau.
- Increased appearances by the speakers bureau at various pertinent conferences.

CLOSING

Ten years after the United States began helping Russia account for, secure, and reduce its nuclear weapons and materials, close to 60 percent of the sites in Russia which contain nuclear materials have not had comprehensive security upgrades. This fact is unfathomable when one considers that al Qaeda, for one, has attempted to steal nuclear weapons and materials from Russia. It is also reasonable to assume that states such as Iraq have tried to steal or purchase weapons or materials from the Russian arsenal rather

than devoting years of effort and billions of dollars to developing a nuclear capability. In addition, insecure nuclear stockpiles can be found at hundreds of sites across the globe. The world will not be secure from the threat of nuclear attack until all the world's nuclear weapons and materials are stored in places that are, in the words of one security specialist, "as secure as Fort Knox." As the United States, its allies, and Russia forge a new, more cooperative relationship, working to account for, secure, and reduce Russian nuclear weapons and materials as well as other inadequately secured nuclear materials should be the top priority of the U.S. government and all responsible governments of the world.

NTRC provides a unique model of political activism—a non-governmental organization using the tools traditionally associated with corporate interests and labor unions to promote policies that will be beneficial to the world in general. In the future, NTRC may work to help coordinate the activities of international NGOs working on nuclear threat reduction. NTRC may, among other things, encourage those NGOs to pressure states that possess nuclear weapons to safely store and/or dispose of their weapons and materials, as well as to ensure that unemployed persons with such expertise have peaceful employment. NTRC's hope is to empower those NGOs to encourage their own governments to assist countries such as Russia in maintaining operational control of nuclear weapons and material. Only through such incremental steps will the threat of mass destruction be reduced.

APPENDIX A

Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign Suggestions Re: Resolution of Ratification to the Treaty of Moscow

The Senate should consider certain conditions to be attached to the Treaty of Moscow's Resolution of Ratification. These could be in the form of either understandings or declarations, as defined by legal scholars as follows:

Understanding – an interpretation, clarification, or elaboration assumed to be consistent with the obligations of the treaty as submitted;

Declaration – a statement of policy, purpose, or position related to the subject matter of the treaty but not necessarily affecting its provisions.

Based on the Senate's hearings on the Treaty of Moscow and related issues, it appears that understandings or declarations with respect to the following matters would enhance and strengthen the Treaty of Moscow and attract significant bipartisan support.

Elimination vs. Storage of Warheads. The resolution should include a *declaration* that, consistent with the Parties' obligations under Article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the greatest extent possible consistent with the Parties' national security needs, warheads removed from the category of "strategic nuclear warheads" be dismantled/eliminated rather than put in storage.

Acceleration and Scheduling of Reductions. The resolution should include a *declaration* by the Senate directing the President, through either the Consultative Group on Strategic Stability, the Bilateral Commission, or otherwise (as appropriate), to seek to establish with the Russian Federation schedules whereby the two countries will make reductions in strategic warheads as quickly as practicable, consistent with their national security needs.

Support for Reductions and Eliminations of Warheads. In support of the obligation of the Russian Federation under the Treaty to reduce warheads and, pursuant to any subsequent arrangements, to dismantle and eliminate warheads, the resolution should include a Senate *declaration* directing the President to take steps to ensure the availability to the Russian Federation, through his budget requests for the Cooperative Threat Reduction program or otherwise, of all assistance necessary to enable it safely to secure and eliminate warheads that it deactivates.

Transparency and Verifiability. The resolution should include a *declaration* by the Senate directing the President, through either the Consultative Group on Strategic Stability, the Bilateral Implementation Commission, or otherwise (as appropriate), to seek an arrangement with the Russian Federation whereby the two countries regularly exchange data regarding warhead reductions/eliminations and have the ability readily to verify the other's data.

Reporting on Reductions and Disposition of Warheads. The resolution should include an *understanding* of the Senate that, pursuant to the Parties' obligations under the Treaty, the Bilateral Implementation Commission should prepare annually a report regarding the reductions in strategic nuclear warheads and the disposition made of the warheads that have been reduced and that this report should be transmitted by the Executive branch to the Congress.

Operational Status of Nuclear Weapons. The resolution should include a *declaration* by the Senate urging both Presidents to direct their defense and military leaders, in joint consultation and collaboration, to devise changes in the operational status of their nuclear forces that would, increasingly over time, reduce toward zero the risk of a launch through miscalculation or accident and provide each President with greater launch decision time and to include in their deliberations consideration of immediately deactivating all warheads scheduled for reduction.

Addressing Tactical Nuclear Weapons. The resolution should include a *declaration* urging the President, through the Consultative Group for Strategic Security or otherwise, to press for action/agreements on the subject of accounting for, securing, and reducing tactical nuclear weapons; and for establishing transparency and verification measures with respect to these weapons.

Addressing the Verification Gap Following Expiration of START. In view of the 3-year gap in verification provisions when START expires in 2009, the resolution should include an *understanding* that the President, through the Bilateral Implementation Commission or otherwise, should work with the Russian Federation to reach agreement to extend START I verification provisions through the life of the Treaty of Moscow.

Clarifying the Absence of a Treaty Floor. The prepared testimony of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff mistakenly states that the Treaty obligates the United States to reduce its strategic nuclear warheads to "between 1700 and 2200," implying that the number 1700 is a floor or minimum. The Treaty itself says that on December 31, 2012, each Party's "aggregate number of such warheads [may] not exceed 1700-2200." To clarify any possible misunderstanding in this regard, the resolution of ratification should include an *understanding* that the number 1700 in Article I of the Treaty does not imply an obligation on either Party to maintain a minimum number of strategic nuclear warheads and calls upon the two Presidents to consider further reductions below this number consistent with respective national security requirements.